U.S. Men’s National Team v. Austria, Vienna, 11.19.13: Michael Bradley and the Ewing Theory

Just days after playing Scotland to a scoreless draw, the U.S. men’s national team lost 1-0 to Austria in the second of their two November friendlies. Despite ending the calendar year with those two unsatisfying results, the U.S. finished 2013 with a gaudy 16-4-3 record.

Most fans and critics of the U.S. team agree that its foremost area of concern is the outside back position. DaMarcus Beasley’s combination of recovery speed, soccer IQ, attacking abilities and overall team performance when he plays left back make him, I think, the best choice to play that position in Brazil. My faith in Beasley remains unshaken after the Austria friendly, but he did have a down performance on Tuesday. He gave attackers too much space on occasion, and was involved in the game’s only goal.

The goal-scoring sequence came in the 33^rd minute and was a good example of how out of sorts the U.S. backline looked during much of the game. With Austria on the attack, Beasley initially slid towards the center to cover Austria striker Marc Janko, who was not closely marked by center back John Brooks. When the ball was played wide to Austria’s right, Beasley therefore found himself out of position. He eventually narrowed the gap, but Austria defender Gyorgy Garics was able to receive a ball in space and send a cross back towards goal that eventually found Janko for the score.

Geoff Cameron was Beasley’s fullback partner. Cameron is best suited to playing in the center, but he’s been forced by his club (Stoke City) and country to spend significant time at right back. (He also occasionally plays midfield for Stoke and the U.S.) Despite some low points—like a bad cross in the 9^th minute and an unforced turnover in the 37^th—Cameron had the best game of any U.S. defender. His deflected header off a Michael Bradley corner in the 17^th minute probably went over the end line before it was swiped out of goal by Austria keeper Robert Almer, and Cameron almost scored from close range in the 66^th. In the 74^th minute, his left-footed ball into the box nearly led to a Jozy Altidore goal. A few more performances like this one, and Cameron will likely supplant Brad Evans as the U.S.’s first-choice right back.

Of the remaining players in this game, few stood out. Altidore had at least three excellent chances but couldn’t take them. Aron Johannsson had a quiet 56 minutes playing behind Altidore in an attacking midfielder role. Jermaine Jones was his usual inconsistent self, alternately winning balls and turning them over. Jones—often described as a red card waiting to happen—also displayed a continued lack of poise. Early in the second half, he punctuated some trash talk with Austria’s burly midfielder Marko Arnautovic by patting Arnautovic on the cheek. Jones was lucky to get away with that one, but there’s zero doubt that 2014 World Cup opponents will target Jones as a player apt to lose his composure and get sent off. Winger Brek Shea started and played 56 mostly desultory minutes, looking particularly lackluster while defending. Shea was slow to track back on Austria’s goal, and he and Gonzalez had to be bailed out by Bradley after some loose defending in the 12^th minute.

Speaking of Bradley, he did not have a good performance by his current sky-high standards. He turned the ball over a few times, including a sloppy giveaway immediately after Austria’s goal that might have doubled their advantage. Still, he played better than most, and the offense tended to move through him. As Landon Donovan said after the Costa Rica match in September, the U.S. team “has in large part been built around Michael.” Most commentators agree that Bradley is the most important player on the team, including the great Ian Darke, who in one 2013 broadcast referred to Bradley as the “glue” of this U.S. national team. Bradley’s teammates defer to him and seek to play him the ball whenever possible. There’s mighty good reason for this. Bradley rarely loses possession and has excellent vision and passing skills.

Having said that, there were times during the Austria match when I sensed that Bradley acted as an inhibitor to his teammates. The urge and/or coaching directive to play through him may mean that the U.S. side is generally less creative, free-flowing and attacking with Bradley in the game. I wondered during the Austria match if the Ewing Theory—roughly, that there are some great players whose teams actually play better when they sit out—might apply to Bradley. I doubt it, and most U.S. fans would consider it heresy and lunacy to even suggest such a thing. But I decided to take look at the U.S. team’s win-loss statistics during the current World Cup cycle. Consider that since the U.S.’s final game in the 2010 World Cup, the Yanks have played 58 matches. During that stretch, and by my unofficial count, the U.S. is 17-10-9 with Bradley in the lineup, for a winning percentage of .597. The U.S. is 15-5-2 without Bradley in the lineup, for a winning percentage of .727.

There are many factors that go into the above winning percentages, such as opponent strength. For example, Bradley wasn’t around for the stat-padding 2013 Gold Cup, when the U.S. went undefeated and crushed such teams as Belize (6-1), Cuba (4-1), and El Salvador (5-1). Then again, that 2013 Gold Cup team was by U.S. standards highly collectively creative and attacking. And it should be added that Bradley was on the 2011 Gold Cup team. That team was thoroughly outclassed by Mexico in the final, losing 4-2. Along the way, the U.S. lost to Panama 2-1 in group play and managed to beat Guadeloupe by the slimmest of margins, 1-0.

None of that is Bradley’s fault, of course, and no one at this point would dream of sitting Bradley in favor of any other U.S. central midfielder. It makes sense that the current team is built around him, as Donovan observed. But between now and the World Cup, coach Jurgen Klinsmann’s challenge will be to ensure that the U.S. team doesn’t become too one-dimensional, that Bradley is regarded by teammates as the primary, but not sole, option to begin attacks.