Just days after
playing Scotland to a scoreless draw, the U.S. men’s national team lost 1-0 to
Austria in the second of their two November friendlies. Despite ending the
calendar year with those two unsatisfying results, the U.S. finished 2013 with
a gaudy 16-4-3 record.
Most fans and
critics of the U.S. team agree that its foremost area of concern is the outside
back position. DaMarcus Beasley’s combination of recovery speed, soccer IQ, attacking
abilities and overall team performance when he plays left back make him, I
think, the best choice to play that position in Brazil. My faith in Beasley
remains unshaken after the Austria friendly, but he did have a down performance
on Tuesday. He gave attackers too much space on occasion, and was involved in
the game’s only goal.
The goal-scoring
sequence came in the 33rd minute and was a good example of how out
of sorts the U.S. backline looked during much of the game. With Austria on the
attack, Beasley initially slid towards the center to cover Austria striker Marc
Janko, who was not closely marked by center back John Brooks. When the ball was
played wide to Austria’s right, Beasley therefore found himself out of
position. He eventually narrowed the gap, but Austria defender Gyorgy Garics was
able to receive a ball in space and send a cross back towards goal that
eventually found Janko for the score.
Geoff Cameron was
Beasley’s fullback partner. Cameron is best suited to playing in the center,
but he’s been forced by his club (Stoke City) and country to spend significant
time at right back. (He also occasionally plays midfield for Stoke and the
U.S.) Despite some low points—like a bad cross in the 9th minute and
an unforced turnover in the 37th—Cameron had the best game of any
U.S. defender. His deflected header off a Michael Bradley corner in the 17th
minute probably went over the end line before it was swiped out of goal by
Austria keeper Robert Almer, and Cameron almost scored from close range in the
66th. In the 74th minute, his left-footed ball into the
box nearly led to a Jozy Altidore goal. A few more performances like this one,
and Cameron will likely supplant Brad Evans as the U.S.’s first-choice right
back.
Of the remaining
players in this game, few stood out. Altidore had at least three excellent
chances but couldn’t take them. Aron Johannsson had a quiet 56 minutes playing
behind Altidore in an attacking midfielder role. Jermaine Jones was his usual
inconsistent self, alternately winning balls and turning them over. Jones—often
described as a red card waiting to happen—also displayed a continued lack of
poise. Early in the second half, he punctuated some trash talk with Austria’s
burly midfielder Marko Arnautovic by patting Arnautovic on the cheek. Jones was
lucky to get away with that one, but there’s zero doubt that 2014 World Cup
opponents will target Jones as a player apt to lose his composure and get sent
off. Winger Brek Shea started and played 56 mostly desultory minutes, looking
particularly lackluster while defending. Shea was slow to track back on Austria’s
goal, and he and Gonzalez had to be bailed out by Bradley after some loose
defending in the 12th minute.
Speaking of Bradley,
he did not have a good performance by his current sky-high standards. He turned
the ball over a few times, including a sloppy giveaway immediately after
Austria’s goal that might have doubled their advantage. Still, he played better
than most, and the offense tended to move through him. As Landon Donovan said
after the Costa Rica match in September, the U.S. team “has in large part been
built around Michael.” Most commentators agree that Bradley is the most
important player on the team, including the great Ian Darke, who in one 2013
broadcast referred to Bradley as the “glue” of this U.S. national team. Bradley’s
teammates defer to him and seek to play him the ball whenever possible. There’s
mighty good reason for this. Bradley rarely loses possession and has excellent
vision and passing skills.
Having said that,
there were times during the Austria match when I sensed that Bradley acted as
an inhibitor to his teammates. The urge and/or coaching directive to play
through him may mean that the U.S. side is generally less creative,
free-flowing and attacking with Bradley in the game. I wondered during the Austria
match if the Ewing
Theory—roughly, that there are some great players whose teams actually play
better when they sit out—might apply to Bradley. I doubt it, and most U.S. fans
would consider it heresy and lunacy to even suggest such a thing. But I decided
to take look at the U.S. team’s win-loss statistics during the current World
Cup cycle. Consider that since the U.S.’s final game in the 2010 World Cup, the
Yanks have played 58 matches. During that stretch, and by my unofficial count,
the U.S. is 17-10-9 with Bradley in the lineup, for a winning percentage of
.597. The U.S. is 15-5-2 without Bradley in the lineup, for a winning
percentage of .727.
There are many
factors that go into the above winning percentages, such as opponent strength.
For example, Bradley wasn’t around for the stat-padding 2013 Gold Cup, when the
U.S. went undefeated and crushed such teams as Belize (6-1), Cuba (4-1), and El
Salvador (5-1). Then again, that 2013 Gold Cup team was by U.S. standards
highly collectively creative and attacking. And it should be added that Bradley
was on the 2011 Gold Cup team. That
team was thoroughly outclassed by Mexico in the final, losing 4-2. Along the
way, the U.S. lost to Panama 2-1 in group play and managed to beat Guadeloupe
by the slimmest of margins, 1-0.
None of that is
Bradley’s fault, of course, and no one at this point would dream of sitting
Bradley in favor of any other U.S. central midfielder. It makes sense that the
current team is built around him, as Donovan observed. But between now and the
World Cup, coach Jurgen Klinsmann’s challenge will be to ensure that the U.S. team
doesn’t become too one-dimensional, that Bradley is regarded by teammates as the
primary, but not sole, option to begin attacks.